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REMANDING AN IN-SERVICE CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR CASE TO THE MILITARY: USE OR
ABUSE OF THE POWER TO REMAND
JERRY G. DuTERROIL

Henry Weber was inducted into the United States Army after failing
in his claim for conscientious objector (hereinafter referred to as CO)
status before his local selective service board. He refused to carry a
weapon when ordered at basic training and subsequently was court
martialed and sentenced to six months at hard labor. Thereafter, he
again refused to carry a weapon. This time he was tried and sentenced
to death." Some twenty-five years later, in the midst of our nation's
longest and most unpopular war, another "Henry Weber" could possibly find himself honorably discharged from our armed forces, either
by military approval or a federal court order. The path which the
in-service CO has followed over the past twenty-five years was neither
paved, nor charted, and is still far from its end. Nonetheless, one who
finds military life inconsistent with his beliefs, today, can be discharged
from our nation's armed forces. If one's discharge is denied, he may
resort to the federal courts for relief by the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
Recently, the federal courts have remanded cases back to the Conscientious Objector Review Board for further proceedings. The problem dealt with herein concerns the proper instances where the courts
should remand an in-service CO case to the military. In analyzing the
problem, the focus of attention will be on three recent cases where the
remanding procedure was employed.
BACKGROUND OF THE IN-SERVICE CO CLAIM

From the beginnings of our existence as a nation, special consideration was given to conscientious objectors:
As there are some people who from Religious Principles cannot
bear Arms in any case, this Congress intend no Violence to their
Consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them to Contribute
Liberally, in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their
distressed Brethern in the several Colonies, and to do all other
services to their oppressed country, which they can consistently
with their Religious Principals. Continental Congress, July 18,
1775.2
1 M. WITTLES, ADVICE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE ARMED FORCES 14 (1st ed.
1971); Weber's sentence was later reduced to life, then to 20 years, and finally five years
and a dishonorable discharge.
2 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 189 (1905).
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This early expression of our conscientious objection policy has been
recognized from time to time throughout our history 3 and is presently
recognized under section 4560) of the Military Selective Service Act
of 1967, 4 which provides exemption from service in the Armed Forces
of the United States for conscientious objectors. 5 Section 456(j) applies
to those who assert their claim of conscientious objection prior to entry
into the service. Obviously, the question arose as to whether in-service
conscientious objectors were denied "equal protection" of the laws,
since their counterparts in civilian life could process their claim under
the draft law. However, this issue was avoided by the issuance of Department of Defense Directive 1300.6 (1962)." The directive set forth
the policies and procedures for the transfer of men who were found
to be opposed to all military duty.7 In accordance with DOD Directive
1300.6, each of the armed services and the Coast Guard adopted regulations8 based essentially on the directive, thereby enabling in-service
CO claimants to be discharged if they meet essentially the same criteria
for CO exemption as their civilian brethren. 9 The military authorities
still have the discretion to refuse the classification or to deny the
3 For a history of consdentious objector provisions see Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409 (1952);
Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51
GEO. L.J. 252 (1963).
450 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1970).
550 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1970) states: "Nothing contained in this title . . .shall be construed
to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service ... who, by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form."
6 DOD Dir. 1300.6 issued August 21, 1961.
7 Non-combatant service is defined in DOD Dir. 1300.6, III, A, as
...service in any unit of the Armed Forces which is unarmed at all times; 2. service
in the medical department of any of the Armed Forces wherever performed; or 3. any
other assignment the primary function of which does not require the use of arms in
combat provided that such other assignment is acceptable to the individual concerned
and does not require him to bear arms or to be trained in their use.
Non-combatant training is defined in the DOD Dir. 1300.6, III, B, as "Any training which
is not concerned with the study, use or handling of arms or weapons." In some cases
servicemen were granted a CO transfer to noncombatant status. United States v. Purvis,
403 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 413 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.
1969); United States v. Martin, 416 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Nelson, 299
F.Supp. 300 (D. Minn. 1969).
8 The regulations pursuant to DOD Dir. 1300.6 in effect are:
Army: AR635-20 (August 15, 1970) (active personnel)
Ar 135-25 (August 1, 1970) (reservists)
Air Force: AFR 35-24 (May 1, 1970) (active and reserve)
Navy: BUPERSMANUAL Article 1860120 (August 21, 1970) (active and reserve)
Marine Corps: MCO 1306.16B (June 18, 1969) (active and reserve)
Coast Guard: COMDTINST 1.900.2 (Oct. 7, 1968) (active and reserve).
9 DOD Dir. 1300.6, IV, B, 3b, reads: "Since it is in the national interest to judge all
claims of conscientious objection by the same standards, . . . Selective Service System
standards used in determining . . . classification of draft registrants prior to induction
shall apply to servicemen who claim conscientious objection after entering military
service."
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applicant's request.' 0 It is the exercise of this discretion which has
been challenged through habeas corpus proceedings."
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE IN-SERVICE CO

Four years after the DOD Directive, the federal courts encountered
petitions of habeas corpus 12 from servicemen whose applications for
CO discharge had been denied by the military."3 Initially, the courts
adhered to the longstanding tradition of judicial nonintervention in
military affairs by denying jurisdiction to review military CO claims
by way of habeas corpus proceedings. 14 This tradition stemmed from
the notion that a review of military administrative decisions created
undue interference with the Executive Branch, and thus repugnant to
the "separation of powers" concept.' 5 Also, the judiciary feared that
the morale and discipline of the armed forces would be undermined
by judicial meddling. However, the landmark case of Brown v.
McNamara (1967),16 admitted that the federal courts have the power
to review denials of CO discharge requests by the military, though the
court ruled adversely to the petitioner on the merits. Then, in Hammond v. Lenfest (1968), 17 the first in-service objector was ordered released by the military because there had been "no basis in fact" for
10DOD Dir. 1300.6, IV, B, states ". . . bona fide conscientious objection . . . will be

recognized to the extent practicable and equitable." DOD Dir. 1300.6, IV, B, 1, states
"Administrative discharge prior to the completion of an obligated term of service is discretionary with the military service concerned .... "
11 In light of the language in the DOD Dir. 1300.6, IV, B, 1, an intolerable situation
would exist if military conscientious objection determinations were not reviewable by the
courts. The armed services could conceivably make a farce out of the DOD Dir. by
routinely denying discharge, even though one would meet the criteria established for a
conscientious objector classification.
12 The federal writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970), is the appropriate means
to test the legality of military custody of a serviceman. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236, 83 S. Ct. 373, 9 L. Ed.2d 285 (1963); Green v. Sec. of Navy, 264 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1958);
Reitemeyer v. McCrea, 302 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1969); Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp.
250 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
13 In re Kanewske, 260 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Cal. 1966), appeal dismissed as moot sub
nom, Kanewske v. Nitze, 383 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1967). (The district court did agree to
review but upheld the denial of discharge.)
14 Noyd v. McNamara, 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022, 88 S. Ct. 593. 19 L. Ed.2d 667 (1968); Chavez v. Fergusson, 266
F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967), appeal dismissed as moot, 395 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1968).
15The nonreviewability tradition was clearly pronounced by the Supreme Court in
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L. Ed. 842 (1953), when, in refusing to
review a military administrative decision, Justice Jackson wrote:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army .... The military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.
Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with
legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters.
Id. at 93, 73 S.Ct. at 540, 97 L. Ed. at 849.
16387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967) (2-1 opinion), cert. denied sub nom., Brown v. Clifford,
390 U.S. 1005, 88 S. Ct. 1244, 20 L. Ed.2d 105 (1968). The district court in this case had
refused to accept jurisdiction-Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967).
17 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
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denying the CO discharge. It is now generally held that the federal
courts can hear petitions of habeas corpus,' and according to the
circumstances, grant the relief sought. 19
In most instances of judicial review of administrative decisions, the
courts employ the "substantial evidence" test, that is, the courts look
to see if there is a substantial factual basis to support the administrative finding. 20 However, the "scope of review" of denials of in-service
CO discharges is limited to a determination of whether the military
21
had a "basis in fact" to support its refusal to discharge the applicant.
This "basis in fact" test was first applied to in-service cases in Gilliam v.
Reeves (1966),22 and thereafter, almost all courts have puportedly applied the test. 23 In this test, often considered the narrowest known to
the law, 24 the administrative decision is upheld if there is the slightest
factual evidence to support the determination of the administrative
board. 25 Although the standard of review might seem harsh to the
18 Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1970), application for stay of deployment
denied as moot, 399 U.S. 902, 90 S. Ct. 2190, 26 L. Ed.2d 557 (1970); Packard v. Rollins, 422
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1970); Quinn v. Laird, 421 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex tel.
Sheldon v. O'Malley, 420 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Bates v. Commander, First Coast
Guard District, 413 F.2d 475 (Ist Cir. 1969); United States ex tel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409
F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1969). But see, Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1022, 88 S.Ct. 593, 19 L. Ed.2d 667 (1967).
19 Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971); Silberberg v. Willis, 420 F.2d 662 (Ist
Cir. 1970); Sertic v. Laird, 418 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1969); Emerson v. McKean, 322 F. Supp.
251 (N.D. Ala. 1971); Johnson v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1971); Aquilino v.
Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1053 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Kepple v. Laird, 319 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C.
1970); United States ex tel. Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Benway v. Barnhill, 300 F. Supp. 483 (D.R.I. 1969); Koster v. Sharpe, 303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.
Pa. 1969); Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D.N.J. 1969); Cooper v. Barker, 291
F. Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1968); Gann v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
20 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.01, 29.02 (1958).
21 In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 567 (1946), the "basis
in fact" test was first enunciated for selective service conscientious objector cases. The
reasoning for employing this narrow scope of review is found in 327 U.S. at 122, 123 of
the Estep opinion:
The provision making the decisions of the local boards "final" means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of
judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the classification
made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in
conformity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The
question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact
for the classification which it gave the registrant ....
Id. at 122, 66 S. Ct. at 427, 90 L. Ed. at 573.
22 263 F. Supp. 378, 384 (W.D. La. 1966). The court stated: "The scope for reviewing
the action of a selective service board by habeas corpus is identical to that to be applied
in reviewing the action of the Army." Id. at 384.
23 See Speer v. Hedrick, 419 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1969); Cohen v. Laird, 315 F. Supp.
1265, 1271 (D.S.C. 1970); Rastin v. Laird, 320 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1970); Ross v.
McLaughlin, 308 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (E.D. Va. 1970); Siebens v. Commanding General, 319
F. Supp. 992 (W.D. La. 1970); Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F. Supp. 920, 926 (E.D. Wisc. 1969);
Owens v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States
ex tel. Scott v. Tillson, 804 F. Supp. 406, 410 (S.D. Ga. 1969). But see Silberberg v. Willis,
306 F. Supp. 1013, 1022 (D. Mass. 1969).
24 Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957); see Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375, 380, 75 S. Ct. 392, 395, 99 L. Ed. 428, 433 (1955).
25 It has been asserted that the "basis in fact" test is just as broad as the "substantial
evidence" test. 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29.07 (1958).
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aspirations of the in-service CO applicant, it is so well established that
2
to argue for the adoption of another standard seems fruitless.
THE REMAND PROCEDURE:

A REVIEW OF

THREE RECENT CASES

In determining the class of persons who are entitled to honorable

discharge from the armed forces as conscientious objectors, the military
must consider basically three issues: 27 (1) Is the applicant sincere 2 in
his opposition to all war; 29 (2) Is his belief based upon religious training
and belief, as the term has been construed by Supreme Court deci31
sions;a ° and (3) Has this belief crystallized after entry into the military?
In reviewing the military findings as to these three issues, the courts
must find a "basis in fact" to support a negative answer to any of the
above questions. If such a negative finding by the military is supported
by the record before the court, habeas corpus relief will be denied.
A problem arises though, as to what action the court should
take when
2
the military has incorrectly processed one's application:
26 Cases have questioned the proper standard of review-Minasian v. Engle, 400 F.2d
137 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968); Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587, 596 (9th Cir. 1970).
27 The Supreme Court in Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 91 S. Ct. 2068, 29 L. Ed.2d
810 (1971), outlined the three basic tests one must satisfy in order to meet the burden of
establishing a prima facie case. These three basic tests were pronounced in the cases cited
in the three following footnotes.
28 Witmer v. United States, 548 U.S. 375, 75 S. Ct. 392, 99 L. Ed. 428 (1955).
29 Objection to a particular war will not be recognized-Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 91 S. Ct. 828, 28 L. Ed.2d 168 (1971).
80 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed.2d 733 (1965). Under
Seeger, religion includes "all sincere religious beliefs which are based on a power or being,
or upon a faith to .. . which all else is ultimately dependent." Id. at 176, 85 S. Ct. at 859,
13 L. Ed.2d at 743.
Under Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1796, 26 L. Ed.2d 308,
319 (1970), the term "religious" was expanded to include "beliefs that are purely ethical
and moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon ... [the registrant] a
duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war .... " For a discussion of the
religious criteria in conscientious objector cases see the following literature: Comment,
Selective Service System-Scope of the Conscientious Objector Exemption After Welsh v.
United States, 19 KANSAS L. REv. 231 (1971); Comment, The Conscientious Objector Exemption After Welsh, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 358 (1970); Denno, Welsh Reaffirms Seeger: From A
Remarkable Feat of Judicial Surgery To A Labotomy, 46 INDIANA L. REV. 37 (1970); Comment, Conscientious Objector: Legal Definition of Religion and First Amendment Government Neutrality, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 81 (1970).
81 A request for discharge will not be entertained by the military if the claim is based
on conscientious objection which existed prior to entry in the service and was not made
within the Selective Service System or if the claim was made but denied within the Selective Service System prior to entry into the service. DOD Dir. 1300.6, IV, B, 2. However, the
Army must consider a claim where it is shown that the applicant's beliefs have undergone
change since they were rejected by the Selective Service System. United States ex rel. Barr
v. Resor, 309 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1969). Claims based on conscientious objection growing
out of experiences prior to entering military service, but which became crystallized after
entry, will be entertained. DOD Dir. 1300.6, IV, B, 2.
82 Processing A CO's Request For Discharge: Army Regulation 635-20 "sets forth the
policy, criteria, and procedures for disposition of military personnel who, by reason of
deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, claim conscientious objection to participation in war in any form." Under this regulation, every serviceman on active duty in the
United States Army, may assert his legal right to make a request for discharge as a conscientious objector. Formal application is made by submitting DA Form 2496 (Disposition
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(1)Should the court remand a case back to the military for reprocessing if the record does not reveal a basis in fact?
(2) Should the court remand a case for reprocessing when there
is a basis in fact to support the military's decision to deny a
request for conscientious objector discharge?
These questions were answered in the recent cases of United States
ex rel. Donham v. Resor, Rosengart v. Laird and Rothfuss v. Resor.
United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor"
Cary Donham was a cadet at West Point, who sought a conscientious
objector discharge after his third year. He was denied discharge from
the military on the grounds that "his beliefs lacked the necessary depth
of sincerity."3 4 The Army based its decision apparently on the unfavorable recommendation of the hearing officer, although the chaplain and
the psychiatrist expressed the view that Donham was sincere in his
beliefs and a man of integrity. Petitioner Donham admitted during
the officer interview that though his opposition to war crystallized several months prior to his request for discharge, he waited until the
end of the academic year to insure credit for the courses he was pursuing. On petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district court found that
the Army had a basis in fact, since "petitioner ... continued to serve

in an establishment and learn and teach things he then claimed to
find intolerable as a matter of conscience . . . ."3 On appeal, the
Second Circuit, though agreeing with the lower court that a basis in
fact was present, reversed and remanded the case to the Army because
Form) to one's immediate commanding officer. The serviceman must include in his application certain information as prescribed in the regulation. However, this language is a
minimum and the serviceman may submit additional information to help substantiate his
beliefs and sincerity. Upon submission of the application, the individual is held in his unit
and assigned duties which involve the "minimum practicable conflict" with his beliefs, until
a final determination is made on the application. Arrangements are then made for interviews conducted by a chaplain, a psychiatrist, and by a hearing officer, who has attained
the grade, 0-3 (captain), or higher, and is "knowledgeable in policies and procedures
relating to conscientious objector matters." This interview before the hearing officer allows
the applicant to be heard in support of his request for discharge, and such hearing must
be afforded the applicant unless he waives the "0-3 interview" in writing. After the interview, the hearing officer is required to enter his recommendation and the reasons therefor
into the applicant's file and return the file to the applicant's immediate commanding
officer. The commander then recommends approval or disapproval and the reasons therefor. Subsequently, after more form filling, the entire case file is forwarded to the Adjutant
General, who will make the decision. If the application for CO discharge is denied, the
applicant is furnished the reasons for denial.
This summary is substantially the procedure required in the Army's handling of a CO
matter. However, as mentioned above, one who receives a negative decision from the Department of the Army may petition the appropriate federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus, or even appeal to the Army's Board for Correction of Military Records.
33 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
341d. at 752.
35 United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 318 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 436
F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the Army's determination was not arrived at pursuant to its own regulations. One of the regulations which was not followed was the requirement that the hearing officer be "knowledgeable in policies and procedures relating to conscientious objector matters." 3 The hearing officer
in the Donham case thought that one had to be a member of a church
which advocated opposition to war in order to qualify as a conscientious
objector.3 7 Such a qualification is erroneous as a matter of law and
consequently, the court decided that the officer was not "knowledgeable" as DOD Directive 1300.6 requires.3 8
The government contended that the hearing officer does not make
the determination as to the petitioner's application and further, that
those making the decision did not rely on the officer's findings as to the
applicant's religious beliefs, therefore the violation of regulations did
not prejudice petitioner's application. However, the court disposed of
that argument by insisting on adherence by the Army to its own
regulations.3 9
Whether or not petitioner's unit commander entered a recommendation as to approval or disapproval of the request as required by regulations was the other issue involved. Army regulations require the unit
40
commander to submit a recommendation to department headquarters.
Petitioner argued successfully that his tactical officer was his unit commander as opposed to the commandant of the West Point cadets. Since
his tactical officer did not make a recommendation, the Army violated
the correct procedure required.
The purpose of this regulation is to make available to the Adjutant
General an opinion from someone who knows the applicant personally.
While the commandant is described by law as the immediate commander of the West Point cadets, 41 the personal contact between
commander and cadet is absent. Realistically, the commissioned U.S.
Army officer assigned to each company of cadets42 would seem to
36 AR 635-20, § 4, b(3).
This requirement, known as the "historic peace church" exemption, had not been the
law since the end of World War I. Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76.
38 DOD Dir. 1300.6, VI, B, 4.
39 In Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969), the court spoke to this very point:
Our reluctance, however, to review discretionary military orders does not imply that
any action by the Army, even one violative of its own regulations, is beyond the reach
of the courts. (Citation omitted.) Although the courts have declined to review the
merits of decisions made within the area of discretion delegated to administrativc
agencies they have insisted that where the agencies have laid down their own
procedures and regulations, those procedures and regulations cannot be ignored by
the agencies themselves even where discretionary decisions are involved. Id. at 145.
The doctrine that an administrative agency must adhere to its own rules and regulations
was announced by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 74, S. Ct. 499,.98 L. Ed. 681 (1954). See Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d 187,
191 (6th Cir. 1969); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1968).
40 AR 635-20, § 4, b(4)(b).
41 10 U.S.C. § 4334(c) (1970).
42 10 U.S.C. § 4349(a) (1970).
37
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possess the personal relationship needed to make a recommendation
on the CO request. Thus, the court remanded the case to the Army
with instructions to reprocess the application in accordance with the
above regulations.

48

Rosengart v. Laird4
This second case illustrates how frequently the remand procedure
could be used by a court before determining whether a "basis in fact"
exists.
After petitioner, Rosengart, an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves,
was denied discharge, he commenced habeas corpus proceedings. Following argument on the petition before the district court,45 the case
was remanded to the review board with instructions to answer four
questions 46 concerning the prior determination of the discharge request. In response to Question 3, the board stated that petitioner "had
47
to show that he had some religious training since joining the Army"
in order to be discharged from his military obligation. Subsequently,
the district court found that regulations did not require in-service
religious training, and that the review board performed contrary to
regulations. Instead of issuing or denying the writ, the court remanded
the proceedings to the Army, this time for a de novo hearing and a
finding as to the merits. Once again discharge was denied on the basis
that petitioner's application was grounded on philosophical views,
sociological experiences and a personal moral code. The court stated
that these views did not meet the standards for conscientious objection
under United States v. Seeger.48 However, the district court remanded
the case for determination in view of the newly annunciated standards
in Welsh v. United States.49 After another negative decision by the
board, the court found adversely against petitioner on the merits, and
denied the writ. On appeal, petitioner contended that the multiple
remands to the Army denied him "due process." These remands were
defended by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by
45 See Hollingsworth v. Balcom, 441 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1971) (remanded to have military
process application according to regulations).
44 No. 35684 (2d Cir., June 9, 1971).
45d. at 3301.
48 Question #3 of the four questions put to the Army by the district court:
3. Did the Conscientious Objector Review Board construe the regulations to require
proof that not only had petitioner's opposition to war matured after entry into military
service but that religious training had occurred after entering military service?
Rosengart v. Laird, No. 35684, at 3302 (2d Cir., June 9, 1971).
471d. at 3302.
48 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed.2d 733 (1965).
49 398 U.S. 333, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 26 L. Ed.2d 308 (1970). In Daoust v. Laird, 434 F.2d 520
(D.C. Cir. 1970), the court remanded in order for the Army to consider applicant's request
in light of Welsh. In Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968), on petition for
rehearing, the court remanded because of new military CO regulations. Id. at 718.
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reason that petitioner thereby was given "a fair opportunity to have
the application considered and decided in compliance with established procedural requirements and existing and changing substantive
law . ... "50 The circuit court further stated that to approve the contention advanced by petitioner would place the Army in such a position:
. . . that the Army must in the first and only available instance
act in the most punctilious fashion in the consideration and
determination of a CO discharge application or face the prospect
of losing the services of one of its officers on the smallest procedural
technicality. 5'
52
Rothfuss v. Resor

The Fifth Circuit, in a recent decision, remanded the proceedings
though there was no "basis in fact" to support the Army's determination.
Petitioner Rothfuss' application was disapproved by the Army because his beliefs were not sincerely held. Rothfuss filed his conscientious
objector claim after receiving orders for Viet Nam. The Army found
that this factor cast doubt on the sincerity required to claim conscientious objector status. The denial was upheld by the district court which
found the Army had acted with "basis in fact." 5' 3 On appeal, the circuit
court found nothing in the Army's regulations to support the review
board's decision that a late conscientious objector application indicates
insincerity, and therefore, concluded that a "basis in fact" was not
present to support the denial. Such a finding by the circuit court did
not result in the writ of habeas corpus being granted. Since the record
before the court did not disclose whether timing of the application was
the sole factor which cast doubt on the petitioner's sincerity, the case
was remanded to the district court (or the Army as an alternative), to
conduct evidentiary hearings for determining whether additional facts
existed to provide a "basis in fact" for the denial.54
50 Rosengart v. Laird, No. 35684, at 3309 (2d Cir., June 9, 1971).

51 Id. at 3309. If Army regulations are mere "procedural technicalities," is it then necessary for the Army to comply with regulations to decide if one qualifies for CO discharge?
The district judge indicated at the outset of the case that affirmative evidence in the
record blurred the petitioner's request, and the circuit court referred to all three remands
as unnecessary to a decision on the merits. Accordingly, unless it was necessary to the
court's decision, remanding the case became a procedural delay in deciding whether petitioner should be granted the relief sought. The Army incurred no legal detriment in its
disregard of regulations, and yet, petitioner spent more time unsuccessfully adjudicating
his claim than he will be required to serve on active duty. Seemingly, petitioner's claim
that he was denied due process by the remanding procedures employed by the district
court appears to have warranted more careful consideration by the circuit court.
52 443 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1971).
53 d. at 555.
54 In Zemke v. Larsen, 434 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1970), the court remanded to the Army
because doubt existed as to whether an illegal classification standard was used. The court
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If the timing of the application had been indicated by the record
as the only factor to deny discharge, the writ would have issued. Obviously, this case grants the Army a second chance to develop a valid
reason for the denial. It is the first case heretofore decided in military
CO matters, where no "basis in fact" existed, and yet, the case was
55
remanded.
THE POWER TO REMAND: USE OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION

The judiciary has the discretion to determine whether an in-service
CO case should be remanded or not. It is the exercise of this discretion
which must be scrutinized to determine if due process has been denied
the applicant.
Apparently, as illustrated by the Donham and Rosengart cases, remanding CO cases to the Army will occur if regulations have not been
followed. However, what purpose will this procedure serve if a basis
in fact existed for the denial? If regulations are followed in the reprocessing of an application, the applicant may prove his case to the detriment of the Army. New evidence might be obtained to clarify any
contradictions appearing in the record which provided a basis in fact
originally. As in the case of Donham, petitioner might be granted the
writ after his application has been reprocessed. The two regulations
involved in that case, if followed the second time, could result in the
establishment of a prima facie case which cannot be refuted. Therefore,
in Donham, it seems that the court was prompted to remand for the
purpose of finding any new evidence which might be obtained by
adherence to the regulations.
In Rosengart though, the circuit court referred to the multiple remands as unnecessary to the decision. In view of such language, what
factor moved the district judge to remand three times? Surely the Army's
compliance with the law and its own regulations should be sought, but
if such reason alone predicates a decision to remand, such a procedure
becomes merely a formality. If the court in Rosengart remanded to
solicit more facts in order to make a determination, then the remands
would be a proper exercise of discretion. However, the rationale for
could not determine, therefore, whether the applicant's CO request was properly denied by
the military. Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1971) presented a similar situation
as in Zemke. In Morrison, doubt existed as to whether the Army erred in interpreting the
"crystallization" requirements (Id. at 253 n.4) of AR 635-20. The court stated, "We view
the proper form of relief in such circumstances is that stated by Zemke v. Larsen,
S. . '[T]hedistrict court [shall] allow the Department of the Army a reasonable time for
reconsideration of appellant's application . . . failing which applicant is entitled to his
release.'" Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 256 (1971). In neither Zemke nor Morrison was
remanding employed to solicit additional valid grounds for a "basis in fact."
55 In accordance with this decision in Rothfuss v. Resor, a very recent case was also
remanded-Quamina v. Secretary of Defense, Civil No. SA 71-CA-155 (W.D. Tex. July 23,
1971).
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remanding in Rosengart cannot be fairly ascertained from an examination of the court's opinion.
Judge Lumbard, the dissenting circuit judge, pointed out that th e
case was initially remanded "to determine, inter alia, whether . . .
'petitioner's opposition to war is not genuine or sincere on the basis of
affirmative evidence.' "56 Further, according to the dissent, the review
board did not doubt the sincerity of petitioner's opposition to war, but
disapproved the application because Rosengart's beliefs were based
primarily on personal moral, philosophical and sociological reasons. Did
the court then abuse its discretion in remanding the case to solicit a
basis for denial not advocated by the review board? Fairness and justice
dictate that the court should not supply the reason for denial when the
board's reason is not substantiated by the record or erroneous as a
matter of law. Further, it is submitted that where military regulations
have been ignored but a basis in fact does exist, the courts should not
deny the writ. Rather it should remand the case to the military for
reprocessing in accordance with regulations, retaining jurisdiction, to
insure compliance by the military authorities and to protect the serviceman from harmful military action. 57 When the application has been
completely reprocessed according to regulation, the court should pro58
ceed to a determination based on the new record.
A clear case of the court abusing its discretion by remanding is presented in the Rothfuss case. The effect of the remand will give the
Army another opportunity to supply the "basis in fact" which was
lacking when the court heard the case on appeal. Since a "basis in
fact" was not present the writ should have been granted as a matter
of law and the court's action appears to be an abuse of the discretionary
power to remand.
59
An analogous situation to Rothfuss arose in Bohnert v. Faulkner,
where the court considered the possibility of remanding the proceedings. However, the court chose not to, stating:
...since the question at issue on judicial review is whether the
Board had a basis in fact for its determinations . . . and since that
issue is basically one of law to be determined from the record that
was before the Board, we decline to remand for an evidentiary
hearing. 60
56 Rosengart v. Laird, No. 35684, at 3317 (2d Cir. June 9, 1971).
57 Such a procedure was submitted in Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1968) where
the court prohibited the military from activating a reservist whose request for an occupational waiver of the short hair requirement was being reprocessed.
58 This procedure was suggested by Krieger v. Terry, 413 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1969) where
the problem was what action the court should take where the in-service administrative
remedies were not complete.
59 438 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1971).
60 Id. at 756, n.4.
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It is suggested, then, that where the military fails to follow its own
regulations in the processing of a conscientious objector claim, the writ
should be granted immediately, if no basis in fact is found in the record.
CONCLUSION

As long as Congress provides an exemption from our armed forces
for those who as a matter of conscience are opposed to all war, and that
privilege is extended to servicemen, every guarantee must be afforded
the CO claimant that his claim will be processed and determined according to law. 61 It is hoped that the remanding procedure will only
be employed to insure that objective.
61 Of 1,106 men in the Army who applied in 1970 for discharge as conscientious objectors, only 357 had the request approved. San Antonio News, Sept. 1, 1971. § A, at 2, col. 4.
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